Nuclear is Our Future Pro-nuclear activist group

The NRC has proposed implementing one of the few POGO recommendations I agree with: reducing hours for security guards at nuclear power plants. I’d like to take this opportunity to draw a distinction between watchdogs and attack groups. We don’t like to engage either, since neither tend to know what they’re doing, and the NRC’s unwillingness to admit anyone to discussions who isn’t a member of the good ol’ boy network doesn’t help, but I submit that there is a difference that we need to be aware of.

We’re used to being under attack; there hasn’t been a moment in the last 40 years when we weren’t. We are used to ignorant arguments coming from groups that are trying to shut down the industry, and accordingly have gotten used to taking any ignorant argument as a threat to shut down the industry. This, I believe, is a mistake.

Greenpeace and NIRS are attack groups. They have campaigns, use words like “shut” and “stop,” and have a stated aim of trying to destroy nuclear technology. They cannot be reasoned with; they must be exposed as fools in public, their sources of volunteers and money cut off, and the loons in charge marginalized. We are familiar with them, their message, their strategy, and their tactics.

POGO, on the other hand, suffers from exactly the same problem as the industry and NRC: nuclear exceptionalism. They are a watchdog group; they believe that the NRC and government in general are not doing the best possible job and are trying to expose problems so they can be fixed. We disagree with them a lot, but they’re not out to get us. They aren’t the problem. Don’t attack them in the manner that Greenpeace and NIRS attack the industry.

Joe Six-Pack thinks nuclear power plants pollute, are unsafe, and produce piles of leaking, deadly waste. They want a good reason to think that nuclear power plants don’t do any of those things, and we can provide it–if we act graciously and professionally, and not wimpy or suburban, and destroy these urban myths with real information. As I’ve said before, people are not dumb–they just have other things to worry about. Tell me an auto mechanic can’t understand how a nuclear power plant works.
The key is, they can’t figure it out on their own. We have to do what every other technology proponent does, and provide information and involvement. Whatever you want to say about how it should be, the public is the boss.

Filed under Activism, Nuclear Exceptionalism, Politics and Regulation, Security and Terrorism, Their Actions

Posted on June 3, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

Rep. Nita Lowey, that eminent friend of nuclear power (joined by woo-woo John Hall as well as Eliot Engel, Maurice Hinchey, and Christopher Shays), is sponsoring a bill intended to make it even more unnecessarily difficult to build a nuclear power plant–or relicense one.

-Require that the NRC determine that plants are safe. In other words, add another piece of paper onto a process that already works.
-Require that the NRC certify that each nuclear power plant doesn’t have security vulnerabilities during the licensing process. In other words, the effects of a terrorist attack are the victims’ fault.
-Add another level of bureaucracy to the evacuation plans requirement, and expand the EPZ to 50 miles. More stakeholders can veto the plan under this proposal than possible today–any state within 50 miles or any federal agency involved in emergency management–increasing the likelihood of Shoreham-type politics.
-Require that the NRC do the same reviews for a renewal that they do for a licensing, most of which are completely pointless, since the design doesn’t change. In reality, all a renewal application should have to prove safety-wise is that a plant’s designed-in safety effects won’t be affected by aging.
-Require the NRC to determine in any relicensing that the population density around the plant hasn’t changed to the point where it is defined as “urban siting,” which is bad for some reason. In other words, shut down Indian Point.

Fortunately, the bill doesn’t have a snowball’s chance in hell of getting past President Bush even if it did pass. But we’re going to have to watch out for this in a couple years, when either Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton will be eager to prove that they’re tough on these “problems.” Indian Point is going to have a constant fight on its hands come 2009.

Oh, and four Democrats and one Republican do not a bipartisan coalition make. Maybe they put the “coal” in “coalition” (or the “mental” in “environmentalist”), but not much more.

Filed under Emergency Response, Perception, Physics, Politics and Regulation, Safety, Security and Terrorism, Their Actions

Posted on June 1, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

$50 million has been approved by a House committee for an IAEA program to guarantee nuclear fuel to countries that waive their right to fuel cycle facilities. There are a number of things wrong with the concept, however:

1. There’s nothing wrong with fuel cycle facilties, and there are ways to determine whether a dual-use facility (one that can theoretically be used for civilian or military applications) is being used for peaceful purposes. The problem is not the presence of the facilities; it is excess capacity at those facilities. Giving them long-term customers–nuclear power plants–is the only reliable way to ensure that they aren’t used by the military. They can also be designed to not be able to handle weapons-grade material, or more advanced fuel cycles can be used that don’t require enrichment or plutonium recovery. This program codifies the idea that reprocessing is plutonium recovery, which it usually is, but doesn’t have to be. It does not in any way weaken nonproliferation efforts to draw a distinction between them, and actually strengthens them by removing an excuse to have a dual-use facility.
2. Taking existing military facilities and using them for peaceful purposes is a good thing. This program would ask countries to entirely dismantle them.
3. Countries opt for nuclear power largely for security reasons. Gas can be cut off and start causing blackouts within a few hours–but nuclear reactors can be run for up to two years without refueling, so there is no point to cutting off nuclear fuel shipments as a political negotiating tactic. Requiring countries to give up their “stash” of unused fuel and mandating that they maintain a “good record” with an international community dominated by radiophobe politicians or lose their fuel shipments erodes the independence provided by nuclear power. More here.

Link.

Filed under Fuel Cycle, International, Iran, Proliferation, Security and Terrorism

Posted on May 31, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

This one includes an assessment of terrorism as though it were a consequence of building the facility. Obviously, terrorism is an attempt to destroy the facility, not a risk of its operation, so there’s no need to evaluate it. Are riots to be used as a mark against integration?

Update: Mothers for Peace has issued the predictable press release, saying that the facility shouldn’t be licensed until every possible terrorism scenario has been shown to be completely impossible, which obviously can’t be done.

Link.

Filed under Double Standards, Politics and Regulation, Security and Terrorism

Posted on May 31, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

The USS Kitty Hawk–a conventional ship–is being prepared for decommissioning. It will be replaced by a nuclear-powered one.

How about a few more like this, to significantly reduce the Navy’s oil use?

Link.

Filed under Alternatives, Applications, Security and Terrorism

Posted on May 26, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

“The internal report from the FKA reveals that the incident (amongst other things) has to do with a continuous degradation in the security culture at the plant.”

-Decommission

Why should nuclear power plants have a security culture? They’re not an army base.

There should be a culture of transparency and openness to the public they serve–it’s not as though there are any security secrets.

Filed under Anti-Nuclear Quote of the Day, Security and Terrorism

Posted on May 25, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

“The nuclear industry asserts that the cost and time it would take to sufficiently harden or retrofit these power plants makes taking safety measures impractical. But what if there were a low-cost way to quickly improve a nuclear facility’s survivability?

There is a way. It’s called “Beamhenge.”

Beamhenge is simply a line of steel beams set vertically in deep concrete foundations connected by bracing beams, a web of high-strength cables, wires, and netting linking the vertical beams to form a protective screen — the nuclear-grade equivalent of fences erected around golf driving ranges.”

-Committee to Blow the Bridge

Ah, yes–gimme that old time religion, eh?

Filed under Anti-Nuclear Quote of the Day, Security and Terrorism, Their Actions

Posted on May 24, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

Part 2 of this anti-nuclear email alert contains two major misconceptions.

1. That the security presently used at nuclear power plants is necessary. There is absolutely no point to it; a terrorist couldn’t really do anything if they did get in. It reflects the nuclear industry’s tendency to accomodate requests because they can (not due to necessity) and their penchant for overkill.

2.

“Nuclear plant operators can build all the walls or blast-resistant chambers they want, but if they’re not screening the security personnel, none of that will matter.”

-Rep. Ed Markey, perennial friend of nuclear power

Actually, yes, it all does matter, and physics overrides the intentions of those involved–good or not.

Filed under Physics, Practical Problems, Security and Terrorism

Posted on May 20, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

They apparently want to modify the existing design to make it more resistant to superjumbos like the Airbus A-380.

Incidentally, the only other reactor design that has received this certification was the Russian AES-92 (their version of the AP-1000). That design is just as good as an AP-1000, but would probably be laughed out of the NRC design certification process.

Link.

Filed under International, Politics and Regulation, Safety, Security and Terrorism

Posted on May 20, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

What, you mean uranium doesn’t come from the Middle East?

Link.

Filed under Energy, Fuel Cycle, Security and Terrorism

Posted on May 18, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »