How to Build a Nuclear Reactor, Vintage 1941

The British government was given documents in 1941 describing how to build a nuclear reactor.

And they sat on them.

Until Thursday, May 31.

The Manhattan Project scientists had a plutonium bomb design ready in 1944 and had to wait for a specialized weapons-production reactor to be completed in order to actually build it. If they had known the plutonium was going to be available before 1945, they could have started work on the implosion mechanism–the most difficult part–and had it ready by mid-1943.

I’m sure the families of every person killed on both sides in 1944 and 1945 will say, “Thanks, guys.”

More from We Support Lee.

Filed under Proliferation

Posted on June 3, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

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On the International Fuel Bank

$50 million has been approved by a House committee for an IAEA program to guarantee nuclear fuel to countries that waive their right to fuel cycle facilities. There are a number of things wrong with the concept, however:

1. There’s nothing wrong with fuel cycle facilties, and there are ways to determine whether a dual-use facility (one that can theoretically be used for civilian or military applications) is being used for peaceful purposes. The problem is not the presence of the facilities; it is excess capacity at those facilities. Giving them long-term customers–nuclear power plants–is the only reliable way to ensure that they aren’t used by the military. They can also be designed to not be able to handle weapons-grade material, or more advanced fuel cycles can be used that don’t require enrichment or plutonium recovery. This program codifies the idea that reprocessing is plutonium recovery, which it usually is, but doesn’t have to be. It does not in any way weaken nonproliferation efforts to draw a distinction between them, and actually strengthens them by removing an excuse to have a dual-use facility.
2. Taking existing military facilities and using them for peaceful purposes is a good thing. This program would ask countries to entirely dismantle them.
3. Countries opt for nuclear power largely for security reasons. Gas can be cut off and start causing blackouts within a few hours–but nuclear reactors can be run for up to two years without refueling, so there is no point to cutting off nuclear fuel shipments as a political negotiating tactic. Requiring countries to give up their “stash” of unused fuel and mandating that they maintain a “good record” with an international community dominated by radiophobe politicians or lose their fuel shipments erodes the independence provided by nuclear power. More here.

Link.

Filed under Fuel Cycle, International, Iran, Proliferation, Security and Terrorism

Posted on May 31, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

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Iran Update

They haven’t stopped enriching uranium, even under international pressure that seeks to violate their rights under international law; good for them.

According to the IAEA (a real international body, as opposed to the “coalition of the willing”:

1. They haven’t diverted any nuclear material.
2. 2,132 centrifuges are running.
3. If they don’t implement the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it will be more difficult for the IAEA to find all the information they want. (Not mentioned is the fact that the Iranians were implementing it before we started to threaten them.)

Link.

Filed under International, Iran, Politics and Regulation, Proliferation

Posted on May 26, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

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GNEP’s International Prospects

The US, Russia, China, France, and Japan have endorsed the concept.

Notice how that doesn’t include any potential customers. While the reprocessing part of GNEP is an excellent step, the overall assumption that Third World countries can’t be trusted with nuclear technology is absolutely wrong. The laws of physics still apply to the Third World, and an inherently-safe reactor built in the United States would be just as inherently safe if it were built in Ethiopia.

Link.

Filed under Fuel Cycle, International, Missing the Point, Physics, Politics and Regulation, Proliferation

Posted on May 26, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

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Iran Update

First, it has started to appear around the media that the Non-Aligned Movement (essentially, Third World countries who were not thrilled with taking crap off either the United States or the Soviets) supports Iran’s nuclear power program. This is true, and has been for a while, but as yet had only appeared in the Iranian state media, which nobody pays any attention to (and shouldn’t).

Second, Mohamed ElBaradei has suggested that the Iranian enrichment program be capped instead of stopped. Finally, we have someone with a little bit of sense in this debate; unfortunately, he wants to try to slow down their program, which won’t work. We would suggest that they be assured of some customers–probably domestic ones–so that the enrichment facility would be in use and could’t be diverted.

Link.

Filed under International, Iran, Politics and Regulation, Proliferation

Posted on May 20, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

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Anti-Nuclear Quote of the Day

“Reportedly, Dr. Charles Bowman has warned that plutonium stored at Yucca Mountain would remain long after the steel casks holding it dissolve. At that point, the plutonium could migrate and concentrate, while the rock in the mountain could actually accelerate a chain reaction and subsequent explosion.”

-World Information Service on Energy

Now, it is true that, over time and if not used, the plutonium in spent fuel will become weapons-grade (it currently is not). That is one of the biggest arguments against geologic storage on a policy level; a nuclear waste repository that contains reactor-grade plutonium will become a plutonium mine.
However, spent fuel is about 1% plutonium. By the time it would become weapons-grade if left alone that proportion will be even lower. Nuclear weapons are made of essentially pure plutonium, and even then, they don’t go off all the time. A plutonium bomb is extremely finicky, and any suggestion that the flow of groundwater would cause a sphere of pure plutonium metal to assemble, followed by an enormously complicated and precise detonation mechanism appearing from nowhere, is ludicrous.
“Groundwater” brings us to something else: the quote says it will dissolve, but in what? And I’ve never heard of a rock acting to accelerate a chain reaction; methinks pure graphite is pretty rare in nature.

There is a precedent for this: the natural nuclear reactors in the Oklo uranium deposit, which started up about 1.6 billion years ago and ran for about 500 million years. Water flowed constantly through this deposit, yet the plutonium and waste produced by this reactor moved less than ten feet until the reactors were discovered in 1972. And no, the plutonium did not go critical, or react, or explode. It just sat there, for a billion years.

Filed under Anti-Nuclear Quote of the Day, Clueless, Crackpots, Physics, Proliferation

Posted on May 13, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

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University of California Anti-Weapons Hunger Strike

Link.

All I’m saying is “watch out.” These groups have a tendency to suffer from mission creep. What we really need is a few good, articulate, credible students on traditional lefty campuses; UW-Madison has a nuclear engineering program and could be a good place to start.

Filed under Activism, Proliferation, Their Actions

Posted on April 30, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

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EU Sanctions Iran; Russians Sign Agreement to Complete Bushehr Unit 1

That’s totally the wrong approach to take on the EU’s part, which I’ve said over and over.

So I guess the Russians have got the contract for the next two, as well, although this is about the third time they’ve signed an agreement to complete Bushehr Unit 1.

Link.

Filed under International, Iran, New Build, Proliferation

Posted on April 24, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

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North Korea to Conduct More Tests If Talks Fail

Hey, that’s one more that’s not pointed at us, South Korea, or Japan. While you’re at it, why don’t you test them all?

Link.

Filed under International, Politics and Regulation, Proliferation

Posted on April 24, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

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Israeli PM on Iranian Nuclear Program

While it may be possible to “stop it peacefully,” it is also possible to keep this prestige project (which is very important to the national pride of Iran and thus unlikely to be simply abandoned) going peacefully.

It is however good to hear that cooler heads might prevail; at least their voices are being heard. Bombing Iran is not the answer for anyone but right-wing nuts.

Filed under International, Iran, Proliferation

Posted on April 22, 2007 by Stewart Peterson | 0 Comments »

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