Iran’s nuclear program has been subject to near-universal and bipartisan condemnation. However, politicians and pressure groups on both sides have largely ignored the crucial facts:
- Iran hasn’t broken any rules. They are in full compliance with the NPT and, until recently, operated their facilities as though they had ratified the Additional Protocol (even though they hadn’t). A law passed by the Iranian Parliament required the facilities to stop operating under the Additional Protocol if Iran’s case were referred to the UN Security Council. Had the case not been referred to the Security Council, the international community’s demands would have been met.
- The international community has no right under the NPT to demand that Iran shut down a civil nuclear program.
- The controversy is not about nuclear power plants; a purpose-designed nuclear power plant (the type they wish to use) is not a proliferation risk. Neither are 1950s-style reprocessing facilities without weapons-production reactors that Iran doesn’t have, nor any modern facility that doesn’t separate plutonium. This dispute is about one specific part of the preparation of light-water reactor fuel (increasing the amount of usable uranium in a given volume of uranium, known as enrichment). Many fuel cycles do not require enrichment; Canada, for example, has a substantial nuclear power program with no enrichment facilities.
- An enrichment facility can be used to make highly-enriched uranium for an atomic bomb–but only if it is not being used to make fuel for nuclear power plants. These two functions require substantially different configurations, but more importantly, there is only a certain amount of space in an enrichment facility. Ensuring that the facility’s capacity is filled with orders for fuel is the only foolproof way to prevent diversion.
- Iran’s intentions matter less than their ability. Developing nuclear weapons is extremely challenging, to say the least. Even with the proper facilities, it is by no means assured that they will be able to produce the correct materials. Even with the correct materials, it is by no means assured that a bomb made of those materials will actually explode. Even with a working weapon, it is by no means assured that they would be able to deliver it. Every step is extremely complex.
- Light-water (American-style) reactors actually have a negative proliferation risk; they require an enrichment facility to produce fuel instead of highly-enriched uranium. Iran has publicly stated its intention to build these reactors; from a safety perspective, would we rather have American reactors running in Iran or second-rate Russian copies?
- Postulated “secret enrichment programs” are irrelevant to this discussion. The dispute is about the Natanz enrichment facility; should we not ensure that the one we know about is used for peaceful purposes?
- Canadian reactors, especially the third-generation Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR), are very good at lowering the plutonium content of light-water reactors’ spent fuel. This would not require any processing beyond reshaping light-water reactor fuel pellets into Canadian fuel pellets. Light-water reactors do not produce weapons-grade plutonium, but if an Iranian stockpile of non-separated non-weapons-grade plutonium bothers anyone, ACRs can be used to eliminate it.
Accordingly, we propose offering American and/or French nuclear power plants to Iran, with the condition that Iranian enrichment facilities provide the low-enriched uranium fuel. Waste-eating reactors, such as the ACR or Integral Fast Reactor, should be kept open as an option.
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This page was written by Stewart Peterson on May 29, 2009
