$50 million has been approved by a House committee for an IAEA program to guarantee nuclear fuel to countries that waive their right to fuel cycle facilities. There are a number of things wrong with the concept, however:
1. There’s nothing wrong with fuel cycle facilties, and there are ways to determine whether a dual-use facility (one that can theoretically be used for civilian or military applications) is being used for peaceful purposes. The problem is not the presence of the facilities; it is excess capacity at those facilities. Giving them long-term customers–nuclear power plants–is the only reliable way to ensure that they aren’t used by the military. They can also be designed to not be able to handle weapons-grade material, or more advanced fuel cycles can be used that don’t require enrichment or plutonium recovery. This program codifies the idea that reprocessing is plutonium recovery, which it usually is, but doesn’t have to be. It does not in any way weaken nonproliferation efforts to draw a distinction between them, and actually strengthens them by removing an excuse to have a dual-use facility.
2. Taking existing military facilities and using them for peaceful purposes is a good thing. This program would ask countries to entirely dismantle them.
3. Countries opt for nuclear power largely for security reasons. Gas can be cut off and start causing blackouts within a few hours–but nuclear reactors can be run for up to two years without refueling, so there is no point to cutting off nuclear fuel shipments as a political negotiating tactic. Requiring countries to give up their “stash” of unused fuel and mandating that they maintain a “good record” with an international community dominated by radiophobe politicians or lose their fuel shipments erodes the independence provided by nuclear power. More here.
Link.
Filed under Fuel Cycle, International, Iran, Proliferation, Security and Terrorism
Posted on May 31, 2007 by Stewart Peterson |
